Steigert K.I. unseren Wohlstand? Das hängt von uns ab
Durch Künstliche Intelligenz steigt ziemlich sicher die Arbeitsproduktivität und der gesamte Wohlstand. Aber wer hat etwas davon?
Nur die Leute, die Roboter und Rechenleistung besitzen? Was machen die Leute, die ihre Jobs verlieren, aber schon älter sind und nur mehr schwierig und sehr ungern einen neuen Job lernen? Und was macht das mit ihnen emotional?
Die Ökonomin und Ex-Obama-Beraterin Betsey Stevenson (University of Michigan) schreibt:
While we can prepare a new generation for a world in which robots do many of the jobs, preparing a generation midway through their lives is harder. People are resistant to starting over, they mourn what they have lost, and they resent a definition of progress that leaves them diminished in status and income.
The loss of income should be easier to solve than the loss of status. So how important is work and what do we know about it? Is work about the income that it generates or about the meaning and order it gives to our days? Much of the debate about the potential impact of automation on employment is really a debate about how we will spend our time. So it is useful to separate out the question of what will we do with our time if the robots take our jobs from the question of whether we can find a stable and fair distribution of income in such a scenario.
Es gibt viel Arbeit außerhalb von Jobs, die man am Markt entrichtet:
Work is a broader concept than paid labor. Paid labor is the result of a trade- off between leisure, home-produced goods, and market- produced goods. This matters from a measurement perspective because the 1970s was a period of very rapid substitution, with nonmarket- produced goods being substituted by market- produced goods. Women stopped making clothes and making pies and cakes from scratch, and started going to work, buying clothes, and buying pies and cake mixes. Technological change occurred in a way that crowded out homemade goods and crowded in women’s labor force participation. Should we think about this as increasing or decrease in work? One thing is clear, work shifted from outside our typical measurement scope to inside it. For example, I suspect that there are fewer childcare workers today than forty years ago if you count every stay- at- home mom with children as a childcare worker.
Yet, time- use surveys reveal that the decline in hours worked is smaller than measured hours of employment suggest, at least since the 1970s. If we look at time- use surveys, dads are working more hours, even though they are working less in the labor force. Once we account for hours spent on childcare and housework, men work more hours than they did in the 1960s.
Stevenson erwartet, dass es durch K.I. mehr Jobs geben wird, in denen wir uns um andere Menschen kümmern – und die am Markt entlohnt werden. Gleichzeitig sollte der Wohlstand durch K.I. steigen, was uns wieder ermöglichen könnte, weniger für den Markt und mehr für unsere Freunde und Familie zu arbeiten.
Die entscheidende Frage am Ende sei:
Do we embrace technology and increase funding for education, worker training, the arts, and community service? Or do we allow inequality to continue to grow unchecked, pitting workers against those investing in robots?